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Avinash Dixit
My field of study encompasses microeconomic theory, game theory, international trade, industrial organization, growth and development theories, public economics, political economy and new institutional economics. I am especially interested in private institutions and how these may transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. In my work I attempt to examine the scope of informal governance and explain, for example, why state law dovetails with some non-state institutions and collides with others. This can help less-developed countries and transition economies devise better processes for the introduction or reform of their formal legal systems. In much of the world (as well as through much of history) private mechanisms--such as long-term relationships, arbitration, social networks to disseminate information and norms to impose sanctions, and for-profit enforcement services--have developed as an alternative to formal, state-governed institutions. Even in countries with strong legal systems, many of these mechanisms continue to operate under the shadow of the law. In my research, I ask questions like: How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? Visit WebsitePublications Lawlessness and Economics
How can property rights be protected and contracts be enforced in countries where the rule of law is ineffective or absent? How can firms from advanced market economies do business in such circumstances? In Lawlessness and Economics, Avinash Dixit examines the theory of private institutions that transcend or supplement weak economic governance from the state. 
The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction Cost Politics Perspective
Most countries' trade policies are so blatantly contrary to all the prescriptions of the economist that there is no way to understand this discrepancy except by delving into the politics. This book presents an improved understanding of the politics of economic policymaking from a transaction cost perspective. The costs of planning, implementing, and monitoring an exchange have proved critical to explaining many phenomena in industrial organization. The author organizes a burgeoning body of research in political economy in this framework. Using U.S. fiscal policy and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as two examples that illustrate the framework, the volume shows how policy often deviates from the economist's ideal of efficiency. The approach reveals, however, that some seemingly inefficient practices are quite credible attempts to cope with transaction costs such as opportunism and asymmetric information. 
Games of Strategy (with Susan Skeath) W.W. Norton and Company
This accessible principles-level text for courses in game theory is a valuable introduction to game theory, offering students an engaging, comprehensive view of the discipline without assuming a prior knowledge of economics or complex mathematics. |
