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Doug Arnold
My published work focuses on congressional politics, national policymaking, the mass media, and Social Security. I have investigated the conditions under which legislators respond to the preferences of ordinary citizens. I have investigated the quantity and quality of coverage in local newspapers in order to determine if the news media provide the kinds of information necessary for ordinary citizens to hold legislators accountable for their actions in office. I have also investigated the stability of the political coalitions supporting Social Security and how those coalitions might change in the event of privatization. My current research focuses on now citizens have evaluated New York City mayors from Lindsay to Bloomberg. Visit WebsitePublications Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence
How much influence do congressmen and bureaucrats have over each other's policy decisions? Doug Arnold focuses on the efforts of congressmen to influence bureaucrats' decisions concerning the geographic allocation of federal expenditures. Arnold argues that bureaucrats seeking support enter a marriage of convenience, by tailoring their allocation strategies to fit each program's situation in Congress. 
Congress, the Press, and Political Accountability
How do local media outlets cover members of the United States Congress? Do local newspapers provide the information citizens need in order to hold representatives accountable for their actions in office? In contrast with previous studies, which largely focused on the campaign period, Doug Arnold tests various hypotheses about the causes and consequences of media coverage by exploring coverage during an entire congressional session. The variation in coverage is enormous and only the most competitive races, and those commanding huge sums of money, receive extensive coverage. 
The Logic of Congressional Action
Yale University Press Congress regularly enacts laws that benefit particular groups of localities while imposing costs on everyone else. Sometimes, however, Congress breaks free of such parochial concerns and enacts bills that serve the general public, not just special interest groups. In this book, Doug Arnold offers a theory that explains not only why special interests frequently triumph but also why the general public sometimes wins. 
Framing the Social Security Debate: Values, Politics, and Economics (ed.) 
Issues in Privatizing Social Security |
