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Last Update Oct 18, 2008
 

Nolan McCarty

 
 

My most recent book, Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches considers the consequences of growing income inequality for political participation and public opinion. Wealth disparity, immigration, and other social forces, have created a pattern of give and take, back and forth causality. Polarization and income inequality fell in tandem from 1913 to 1957, then rose together dramatically from 1977 onward. Republicans moved right, away from redistributive policies that would reduce income inequality. At the same time, immigration facilitated the move to the right: non-citizens, representing an increasingly larger share of the population and disproportionately poor cannot vote; thus, there is less political pressure from the bottom for redistribution than there is from the top against it. In "the choreography of American politics" inequality feeds directly into political polarization, and polarization in turn creates policies that further increase inequality.

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Publications

Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (with Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal). MIT Press

The idea of America as politically polarized--that there is an unbridgeable divide between right and left, red and blue states--has become a cliché. In Polarized America, Nolan McCarty, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal examine the relationships of political polarization, wealth disparity, immigration, and other forces, characterizing it as a “dance” of give and take and back and forth causality. In "the choreography of American politics" inequality feeds directly into political polarization, and polarization in turn creates policies that further increase inequality.
Political Game Theory Cambridge University Press (with Adam Meirowitz).

Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. This book is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics and traditional economics. There are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.