|
Jessica Trounstine
Broadly speaking my research seeks to explain the process and quality of representation. I am particularly focused on the ways in which formal and informal political institutions enhance or limit the ability of residents to achieve responsive government. My work has sought to understand these topics at the sub-national level, primarily in American cities. My scholarship is conscientiously mixed-method; reliant on historical analysis, qualitative data, and quantitative/ statistical methods. I am the author of a number of articles that draw on these themes and I have recently completed a book manuscript that explores them in depth. My book, entitled Urban Empires: Political Monopolies in American Cities, studies the conditions under which democratic institutions function to represent people and the conditions under which they fail. One of the most pervasive assertions in political science is that democratically elected politicians are held accountable to constituents though their quest for reelection. In contrast to this view, I contend that many reelection strategies employed at the local level bias the system in favor of incumbents, breaking the electoral connection and leaving voters with diminished capacity to control their elected officials. When political coalitions successfully limit the probability that they will be defeated over the long term; when they eliminate effective competition, they achieve a political monopoly. In these circumstances the governing coalition gains the freedom to be responsive to a narrow segment of the electorate at the expense of the broader community. Analyzing narrative, historical and statistical data from 244 American cities over approximately 100 years, I find that where politicians successfully bias the system, competition for office declines, turnout is reduced, incumbency advantage increases and spending and distribution of benefits narrows. Underserved and excluded residents respond to this behavior by organizing against the regime in power. Paradoxically, where politicians have control over their fate, their desire for a secure future compromises fundamental requirements for a healthy democratic system and may eventually lead to their own political downfall. Visit WebsitePublications![]() Jessica Trounstine, “Dominant Regimes and the Demise of Urban Democracy.” The Journal of Politics, Volume 68, Number 4 (November 2006), pp. 879-893
Elections can offer citizens representative government, but only when certain conditions are met. I provide evidence that when elections become uncompetitive for long periods of time and political coalitions establish dominant regimes, the distribution of government benefits change. Examining twentieth-century political patterns in nine of the United States' largest cities, I find that dominant regimes establish electoral control, then target core supporters and powerful interests at the expense of the larger community. ![]()
Zoltan Hajnal, Jessica Trounstine . “Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven Turnout in City Politics.” The Journal of Politics, Volume 67, Number 2 (May 2005), pp. 515-535
There is a widespread concern that imbalances in voter turnout across race and class have led to biased outcomes in American democracy. Yet empirical tests have generally found that the unrepresentative nature of the electorate has little effect on who wins and loses elections. We challenge this finding by arguing that existing research minimizes the chances of finding bias because it focuses largely on national elections where turnout is relatively high and where minority groups are generally too small a percentage of the population to sway elections. By focusing on city elections we find that lower turnout leads to substantial reductions in the representation of Latinos and Asian Americans on city councils and in the mayor's office. For African Americans district elections and off-cycle local elections are more important barriers to representation. |