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Danny Oppenheimer
I have broad interests in causal reasoning, judgment and decision making, and more specifically in how reasoning about meta-cognition impacts judgments and decisions. I examine this in the domains of randomness, categorization, quantity estimations, value estimations, inductive reasoning, moral reasoning, risk assessment, and interpersonal attribution. Visit WebsitePublications![]() Oppenheimer, D.M. (2003). "Not so Fast! (and not so Frugal!): Rethinking the Recognition Heuristic". Cognition, 90, B1-B9.
The ‘fast and frugal’ approach to reasoning claims that individuals use non-compensatory strategies in judgment – the idea that only one cue is taken into account in reasoning. The simplest and most important of these heuristics postulates that judgment sometimes relies solely on recognition. However, the studies that have investigated usage of the recognition heuristic have confounded recognition with other cues that could also lead to similar judgments. Two studies provide evidence that judgments do not conform to the recognition heuristic when these confounds are accounted for. ![]()
Oppenheimer, D.M., Leboeuf, R.A., & Brewer, N.T. (in press). "Anchors Aweigh: Investigations in cross-modality anchoring". Cognition.
Anchors can operate across modalities by priming a general sense of magnitude that is not moored to any unit or scale. Participants drawing long “anchor” lines made higher numerical estimates of target lengths than did those drawing shorter lines. A similar pattern was obtained even when the target estimates were not in the dimension of length. An anchor’s length relative to its context, and not its absolute length, is the key to predicting the anchor’s impact on judgments. Finally, magnitude priming (priming a sense of largeness or smallness) is a plausible mechanism underlying the reported effects. We conclude that the boundary conditions of anchoring effects may be much looser than previously thought, with anchors operating across modalities and dimensions to bias judgment |